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* * *

MR. CHISICK: Welcome to the second-to-last copyright panel of the afternoon.
My name is Casey Chisick. I’m a Partner at Cassels Brock in Toronto, and I’m honored,
if a little confused, to have been asked to moderate this panel on the Music
1
Modernization Act (MMA).
For those who are not music copyright nerds and may not have been paying
attention, the MMA was signed into law last October after many years of negotiation,
legislation, and debate. The MMA is the first major amendment to U.S. copyright law
since the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), so that’s kind of cool. It’s actually
three statutes in one:
• The Musical Works Modernization Act revamps the music licensing process for
digital services by creating a new, highly regulated mechanical license collective (MLC)
as a sort of central clearinghouse, and also revamping the rate-setting process for digital
music.
• The Compensating Legacy Artists for their Songs, Service, and Important
Contributions to Society Act (CLASSICS) requires royalties to be paid for the
performance of pre-1972 sound recordings used on digital radio.
• The Allocation for Music Producers Act (AMP) requires part of those royalties
to be distributed to producers, mixers, and sound engineers who were involved in
creating the sound recordings.
There was a fourth piece. To the surprise of no one, I think, the Fair Play Fair Pay
2
Act, which would have required terrestrial radio stations to pay royalties for public
performance of sound recordings, didn’t quite make the cut.
The legislation overall, despite its controversial nature, worked out pretty well in
the end. It was passed unanimously by Congress and most of the stakeholders seemed to
be pretty pleased with the outcome. The main constituencies — music publishers,
songwriters, digital musical services, record labels — generally seemed pretty satisfied
with the outcome as far as I can tell.
Of course, the devil is in the details, and implementation of course will be a
challenge, and fissures have already started to emerge as the Copyright Office considers
which of two competing groups to designate as the mechanical licensing collective.
Of course, there are those who doubt that it will ever be possible to achieve the
key goals of the MMA, including, most importantly, the creation of a comprehensive,
reliable database of musical works and information on the rightsholders who own them.
Complexity abounds. It will take the music industry some time to adjust, and
we’ll see how this all plays out. Fortunately, Fordham has assembled an all-star panel to
explore those issues.
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I want to introduce them. Professor Justin Hughes from Loyola Law School is
going to discuss, among other things, the opportunities and the challenges of the new
database. Professor Sean O’Connor from the University of Washington School of Law
will talk about another perspective on the implementation and governance of the new
mechanical licensing system. Richard Reimer, in-house counsel at the American Society
of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), is going to look at the other
music-licensing provisions of the MMA that affect performing rights as well as
mechanical rights.
We have our two panelists who will provide reaction no doubt, and further
commentary: Frank Scibilia, a Partner at Pryor Cashman, and Ken Steinthal from King &
Spalding, a Fordham University grad. They are both leading music industry lawyers who
have been deeply involved both in the MMA itself and in the run-up to it.
Lots to discuss. Great people to discuss it.
Without further ado, I want to invite Professor Hughes to begin with his remarks.
PROF. HUGHES: Thank you, Casey.
If two or three or five years ago you had asked an average person in the copyright
community if we would see a law like the Music Modernization Act, I think that member
of the “copyrati” would have been very doubtful.
Indeed, many of you know that over the last few years of his tenure Chairman
Goodlatte of the House Judiciary Committee held a wide variety of hearings on a
substantial revision of copyright law. I can tell you that by 2016 the congressman’s staff
was thinking about an exit strategy: How do we extradite ourselves from this and not
seem embarrassed? What can we get done? There doesn’t seem to be much we can get
3
done. Well, we’ll say we got the Defend Trade Secrets Act done, so it won’t be a total
wash on intellectual property. So it was always a tremendous challenge, and for many
people it’s just a wonderful surprise how the Music Modernization Act turned out.
The comprehensive database part, which I want to talk about most, is also a
surprise because for many years this idea has been floated. It was floated many years ago
at the WIPO, where the reaction of many of the rightsholders was, That’s a really bad
idea. What might have been a really bad idea in Geneva now turns out to be a really good
idea in Washington.
As Casey said, the Music Modernization Act has these three parts. In reverse
order, they are:
• Title III, the Allocation for Music Producers, codifies a SoundExchange
practice of distributing some of the royalties they collect to sound engineers, sound
mixers, and producers. For people who haven’t followed that carefully, that was kind of a
surprise. They were already distributing that money, so it really is just a codification of a
practice.
• Title II, The CLASSICS Protection Act, which I hope we’ll talk more about.
• Title I, Music Licensing Modernization, replaces the old
sound-recording-by-sound-recording compulsory licensing for digital streaming services
with a new blanket license for digital music providers to make and distribute digital

3
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phonorecord downloads, permanent downloads, limited downloads, and interactive
streams.
As Casey said, this new system requires the creation of a new mechanical
licensing collective that will (a) issue and administer the blanket licenses, (b) receive the
proceeds of the blanket licenses, and (c) distribute the proceeds to composers and music
publishers. To do (c), as Casey said, the music licensing collective will need to develop
an authoritative database of musical composition ownership information in relation to
sound recordings. I emphasize that because that makes it harder.
There is a huge amount of stuff in the MMA, and I don’t claim to understand it
all, but I want to focus on the promise of the blanket license and the challenge of the
database project.
The promise of the blanket license. Generally speaking, at an event like this you
learn from copyright owners that they don’t like blanket licenses, and they aren’t
supposed to like compulsory licensing mechanisms. But, as academics said in a letter to
Chairman Goodlatte many months ago, “At present, the lack of an authoritative resource
for identifying copyright owners for musical compositions limits music licensing
opportunities and impedes the prompt payment of songwriter royalties.” Now, that was
putting it very politely.
Under the old system, when a digital music provider wanted to exercise the
compulsory license, it sent a Notice of Intention to the copyright owner; and if they
couldn’t find the copyright owner or the owner was unknown or uncertain, they sent an
“address unknown Notice of Intention” to the Copyright Office, which maintains a list of
4
these online. Noticeably, the old statute didn’t say whether in filing this address
unknown Notice of Intention you had to do a reasonable or good-faith search for the
prospective licensor copyright owner; all the prospective licensee needed to do was a
Copyright Office public records search.
Even more importantly, many people interpreted the statutory royalties provision
to mean that they accrued only after the copyright owner had been identified. Spotify was
on record saying, “We hold on to the royalties and we pay them when the copyright
owner is found.” But many thought that was not required by the statute and that a
prospective licensee that filed an address unknown Notice of Intention therefore arguably
enjoyed a period of gratis use up until the point when a content owner came forward.
Our colleagues at the Copyright Office will know better than I, but beginning in
April 2016 digital music services — e.g., Google, Pandora, Spotify — began serving an
unprecedented number of address unknown Notices of Intention on the Copyright Office.
Between April 2016 and January 2017 they filed 25 million address unknown Notices of
Intention, meaning they claimed they could not find these copyright owners. There are
scholars and commentators, like Professor Kristelia García at the University of Colorado,
who believe that much of that was doubtful.
The MMA replaces that system of Notice of Intention and will in fact create a
blanket license, and the blanket license will allow payment into this new collective. Of
course, payment into the new collective is of no use unless there is a way to distribute the
4
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money, and distributing the money equitably and correctly requires an enormous amount
of work gathering this information.
We have to be honest that the database politics are interesting. An incomplete
database could work to the financial benefit of different parties, and that already is a
contentious point.
The new Section 115(d)(3)(E) lays out the requirements of the database. The
requirements of the database and assembling the database are daunting because:
(1) We have to assemble all the musical composition information, ownership
information and composer information, that is in many different places, and some of it is
arguably lost.
(2) We have to match up that information with the sound recordings in which the
musical compositions are embodied.
(3) Even after all that information is collected from the music publishers — often
who do not have complete information about composers that an individual music
publisher doesn’t represent — to do real due diligence for the database there will have to
be a lot of cross-referencing with performance rights organizations (PROs) and, even if
you talk to people at SoundExchange, cross-referencing with all kinds of publicly
available information like MusicBrainz and Gracenote and All Access.
So the challenges of the database are enormous, but we want the database to be
as complete and authoritative as possible.
Lastly — as the explosions and the cannonade or artillery continue — as we
continue to refine the database and make it more authoritative and bring all the
information together, we will find more and more conflicts. A lot of those conflicts will
be false positives (e.g. territorial disputes) and we will be able to sort those out; but some
will not, and that requires a dispute resolution mechanism.
MR. CHISICK: I just want to say that explosion is very un-Canadian.
PROF. HUGHES: It’s America. What can you expect? [Laughter]
MR. CHISICK: We have five minutes for discussion of this topic.
I want to start off the discussion with a simple question that I’ll throw out to
everybody, not just Justin. Can this be done? I mean this is not a new problem. I was
talking to somebody yesterday who said, “The MMA is really solving problems from the
1960s,” and we’ve been talking about a comprehensive musical works database for as
long as I’ve been practicing in the area, twenty years or more. Can this be done? What
has changed that makes now the time for this project to be undertaken, and undertaken
successfully?
PROF. HUGHES: In 2015 Spotify announced it was going to do this, and you
can still read its press release online: “We are going to build a comprehensive database.”
What has changed? First, the technology is much better. Second, we now have a
statutory mandate and we have agreement of all the parties to engage in it. So now it will
be harder for people who don’t want an incomplete database to hide.
MR. STEINTHAL: If I can chime in on that — and, admittedly, I have the
services’ perspective, having represented many of the digital music services over the
years — you referred to the political reasons why there hasn’t been a public database or a
comprehensive database. From my perspective, the reason is publishers have historically
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benefited from a lack of transparency with respect to ownership. Spotify could never do
this without the statute by itself because there is no resource.
Just to give you examples, for the benefit of people who aren’t as close to this as
we are, when a sound recording hits the street, what we call the “street date,” everybody
knows the artist; everybody can know the record company. Probably nobody, unless
they’re a singer-songwriter, knows who wrote the underlying composition; and there are
often multiple composition owners of the same composition.
So the song hits the street. You’re Spotify, you’re Pandora, you’re whoever you
are, broadcast radio, and the information is not available through any mechanism
whatsoever to know who the owners of the composition are of the most popular music,
the music that everybody wants on all these services. Therefore, the services cannot
function without the risk of infringement absent this form of license.
It is a tradeoff. The publishers got a lot. The services have to fund the creation of
this database and have to fund the costs of the music licensing collective going forward.
To your point about paying the money, the services, in my view, have always
been willing to pay the money in as long as they can get immunity from copyright
infringement in return. That’s what the statute provides, the ability to have a single-notice
blanket license. The services get their insurance against copyright infringement claims —
and there were dozens of plaintiffs’ class actions that were benefiting from the cracks in
the system under the old Section 115 license.
That’s the core tradeoff, and I think that’s where everybody got what they really
wanted. The publishers got a system that the services pay for. The services got immunity
from all these class actions.
PROF. HUGHES: But not only is the information not available when the music
hits the street, it may not be finalized. The ownership shares of compositions may not
have been determined yet.
MR. STEINTHAL: That’s why I used the new-release example. It’s not known.
The writers often don’t agree on their splits until weeks or months later. You look at a
song like “Uptown Funk,” which had more than ten writers, and there’s no way those
writers had agreed on their splits when the song hit the street. So there are inherent
problems with new releases.
And then there is the fact that composition ownership changes over the years.
There is no resource where you can go to find out whether the original owner still owns
the rights or has transferred them to someone else.
MR. CHISICK: I want to let Frank weigh in before we run out of time for this
round.
MR. SCIBILIA: I’m coming from the copyright owner perspective. Just as a
caveat, I do represent one of the two competing entities that are seeking to be designated
as the collective.
MR. CHISICK: Oh, we’ll get to that.
MR. SCIBILIA: My views are my own and not necessarily the views of this
entity.
I think the database and the whole system will work. I’m very positive about it.
The reason I’m positive about it is because I think the incentives are now in the right
place.
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.
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I believe that, to some degree, copyright law has been turned on its head. It used
to be that if you wanted to exploit something, you had to go out and find the owner of it,
license it, and then exploit it. Historically, in this digital-streaming environment that
hasn’t been the case because digital services, and record companies to some extent, want
to get sound recordings on the digital streaming services as quickly as possible, and
sometimes before clearing the publishing rights.
This really wasn’t a big problem for the services for a long period of time
because they were content, when they didn’t know who to pay, to just hold the money.
That was until they started getting sued in class action lawsuits, and then they all of a
sudden started thinking, Gee, this might be a problem. Let’s try to see how we can solve
this.
One method the services used to try to avoid legal exposure was to serve bulk
NOIs on the Copyright Office. The bulk NOIs may or may not have given the services
legal coverage — one can ask whether the statutory requirement to make a good-faith
effort to identify the rights owner was complied with — but that still did not get the
royalties into the hands of the correct musical works rights owners.
Now, with the MMA, the tasks of matching and identification rest with the
collective, which has the most incentive to do it correctly. The collective has to be
established by copyright owners, it has to be managed and run by copyright owners, and
the copyright owners have the incentive to make sure that the correct copyright owners
are paid.
I know that at least the MLC, which is one of the two entities seeking designation
as the collective, has the incentive and wants to do all it can to make as many matches as
possible, have as thorough and complete a database as possible, to pay the correct rights
owners and to reduce the amount of unclaimed or unallocated royalties to as close to zero
as possible.
But, of course, the only way the collective can fulfill this mission is if it is
adequately staffed and funded, which is an issue that I know Kenny has flagged for
discussion.
MR. CHISICK: We’ll pick that up after Sean’s presentation. Sean is going to talk
more about the implementation and governance of the collective, so it’s a good segue.
PROF. O’CONNOR: Absolutely. Good.
I’m going to be coming at it from a perspective of somebody who does a lot of
company formation. I’m a professor, but I have also practiced for a long time. I do a lot
with startup companies, with governance of large nonprofits, and things as well. My
comments may seem very small and pedantic, but this is the kind of stuff I worry about
when I’m wearing my lawyer hat. I also had zero role in anything going on with MMA,
so there might be really easy obvious answers to the things I’m going to point out.
When the statute was finalized and came out and I read through the gory details
about the entity and the database, I was really shocked at how much detail about the
governance was baked into the statute. I think that’s normally not a great idea because, in
other words, whatever entity wants to be designated, if it is a preexisting entity, it’s going
to already have to comply with it. For example, weird stuff, like saying what has to be in
the bylaws, a lot of the stuff that’s required to be in the bylaws about a staggered board is
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pretty standard, and the entities that are jockeying for position in this probably have that
anyway; but, if they don’t, they are going to have to revise their bylaws.
The bylaws have to be made public. But who cares about that because if you are
setting up an entity, you could put all the stuff in the charter instead? Maybe you say,
“Well, the charter under state law has to be nominally public.”
It seems weird to me. Again, maybe somebody — maybe Justin — has a really
easy explanation for this. But I found it very odd that so many details for governance
were baked into the statute.
Then, at the same time while we’re looking at that, there are other things that
look odd to somebody who sets up entities.
It’s really odd that a lot of the boards, the voting members themselves on all these
different boards, are even numbers. Anyone who sets up companies knows that’s a
terrible idea because you get deadlocks. You always set it up as an odd number — three,
five, whatever. In the case of the overall governance with the fourteen voting members,
don’t be fooled. It says fourteen voting members and three nonvoting members, so you
get seventeen. But the nonvoting members are nonvoting, so that doesn’t matter, and you
still could have a deadlock with fourteen. If the voting members are ten publishers and
four professional songwriters, there’s probably not going to be a problem there.
But then, if you go down further, the Unclaimed Royalties Oversight Committee
will have five copyright owners and five songwriters. As a total outsider, I think that’s a
little weird. If those two groups get adversarial with each other, you are completely
relying on being able to peel off somebody from the opposing camp. That can happen;
but, as somebody who is also involved in dispute resolution knows, when governance
goes bad it can be hard to do that.
So, there are a lot of problems with the governance requirements.
Another one is the Mechanical Licensing Operations Advisory Committee, which
has no fewer than six and it’s equal between copyright owners and digital music
providers. It seems like that’s a tension right there as well.
While I love the idea of this, I think there are a lot of problems that are going to
emerge as this gets implemented.
Looking at the database itself, I think one of the problems is that we want to set
up all this information that will then be tagged saying, “Here are some sound recordings
and here’s the information behind them,” but with no real sense behind all of this that
digital sound recordings have to have metadata incorporated into them. That makes it
even harder.
One thing that I have been trying to promote — I know it may be an unpopular
idea with some — is that it may be time to suggest or try to mandate that the digital
music service providers only do trade in downloads and streaming of files that actually
have uncorrupted metadata that contains all this database information. If you are saying
all this information is what will identify it in the database, it should be in the files
themselves.
My other concern then is that, as we’ve just heard, the onus is on the copyright
owners to identify the sound recordings that their songs have been mechanically
reproduced in. Some of the stuff you will be able to find through Harry Fox because if
somebody used the Harry Fox system to do the mechanical reproduction that information
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.
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is there. But there’s a lot of stuff on the street that is just dubious; it didn’t necessarily go
through Harry Fox; it’s just somebody made a sound recording and there is no metadata
in it at all.
I was one of the people who used Apple iTunes a number of years ago when they
did that weird “swap in the iCloud” thing. I had recordings that I had bought and ripped
— I guess that was legal — and they replaced it, but it wasn’t even with the original
artist. So now I have a sound recording that I don’t even know who the artist was but I
know who the composer was supposed to be.
I used to be a professional songwriter myself. Even some of my stuff got lost,
like my own recordings that I had put into iTunes myself, meaning stuff I owned,
recorded in a studio on my own, and that went into the ether in a weird way.
The onus really has to be, on not just the copyright owners and songwriters trying
to identify their stuff, but also on the other side, meaning that we can’t be trafficking in
digital downloads or streaming in stuff that has no metadata. Maybe that goes off the grid
— well, not literally off the grid — to pirate sites and things where you know you are
getting essentially counterfeit stuff.
I am going to end a little early because I just wanted to set this up and get the
debate going.
MR. CHISICK: I think you succeeded in doing that.
I want to pick up on that suggestion. I heard Kenny huffing and puffing the
whole time.
MR. STEINTHAL: The notion that the services can solve that problem is absurd.
The services get the data from the record companies. The record companies give them a
feed and that has whatever metadata the labels have.
If you are talking about pirate websites, fine. That’s not who I represent and
that’s not what the MMA is all about. The MMA is trying to solve a problem for the
companies that are generating dozens of millions of dollars in royalties. It is meant to
encourage them to keep paying and to get the money to the writers and the publishers.
So I don’t think it’s fair to say that the services should somehow come up with a
mechanism to get metadata when they are reliant on the labels in the first instance for the
very metadata they have to get.
PROF. O’CONNOR: I’m not saying they have to get it, because I agree that’s
hard. I’m saying that they shouldn’t stream it. If something’s on YouTube — and I’ve
heard some recordings — you get on the list if you look for a certain song, and, as
somebody who’s a musician, I’m thinking, I don’t know who the heck is performing that
song. That’s just a weird recording.
MR. STEINTHAL: We can go back to DMCA panel on that. If people don’t like
the fact that there’s a safe harbor for user-generated content, that’s a different issue than
this issue, which is just coming up with a better system for the main players of audio
streaming to pay money in and get the money back out.
MR. SCIBILIA: But we are not talking about user-generated content. We are
talking about a service like Spotify; and we are not talking about major record labels that
are presumably providing their metadata.
MR. STEINTHAL: First time ever we agree.
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MR. SCIBILIA: We’re talking about Spotify rushing to put stuff up on Spotify,
something that Spotify doesn’t know but perhaps should know is really not authorized or
not really licensed and doesn’t have metadata.
MR. CHISICK: Is this really about the professionalization of metadata and the
professionalization of the services, saying that the services should traffic only in content
that rises to a certain standard of metadata?
PROF. O’CONNOR: Yes. Think about if you are a coffee company and you are
selling coffee that is “fair trade certified.” There are ways that we do that.
PROF. HUGHES: But it’s also about making sure the independent artistic
community eventually gets tools to put the metadata into their digital files.
MR. CHISICK: But those tools exist, don’t they?
PROF. HUGHES: I wanted to talk about something else, Sean.
Sean was talking about the structure of the boards. What he didn’t say is
everyone should know there has been a little bit of a ruckus in Washington that the two
boards proposed by the two contenders are all white, and it has been certainly observed
by the artistic community, which is not all white, that the boards are totally lacking in
diversity at this point. That raises big issues because a lot of African American artists and
a lot of Latino artists feel they have been especially screwed by the music industry. All
artists feel screwed, but the minority artists feel especially screwed. To have the really
bad appearance that the boards of these proposed contenders for the MLC totally lack
diversity was just politically tone-deaf.
MR. SCIBILIA: I will just say that there has been some misinformation about
that. The MLC’s board members were selected in an open and competitive process by
panels of well-respected songwriters and independent music publishers. My
understanding is that in selecting the MLC board these panels did consider diversity,
among many other criteria, including relevant experience and diversity of music genre,
and that the MLC board as constituted is somewhat diverse. It’s not, as you stated, an
“all-white” board.
PROF. HUGHES: Do you want to tell us about the details of “somewhat”
diversity?
MR. SCIBILIA: The MLC’s submission to the Copyright Office, which is
publicly available, identifies all of the board members and provides biographical
5
information for each. The MLC board represents a wide diversity of musical styles and
creators of all backgrounds and it includes racially, ethnically, and gender diverse
members.
PROF. HUGHES: Out of how many?
MR. SCIBILIA: As per the statute, there are fourteen voting and three non-voting
board members.
PROF. HUGHES: Okay.
MR. SCIBILIA: Of course diversity should always be a consideration.
MR. CHISICK: There are a lot of questions about the composition of the boards.
The ruckus is not just about diversity. There are all sorts of ruckus about conflicts of
5
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interest or the appearance of conflicts of interest, and I want to get into that and have a
conversation about it.
Justin, do you have a view on the composition of the board apart from the
diversity issue?
PROF. HUGHES: Not on the composition of the board. And I acknowledge that
once a contender is chosen to be the MLC — and I keep saying MLC because I don’t
know why we keep saying “mechanical licensing collective” for a world of digital
downloads and digital streaming. I think that is really bizarre. So, “the collective.” The
board of the collective will be reconstituted, as I understand it, once a contender is chosen
to be the collective.
MR. SCIBILIA: It may or may not be.
PROF. HUGHES: Hopefully, it would reflect some of these concerns. But again,
that’s one issue where completeness of data in the database and the overarching goal of
the database and its success — the more it is complete, the more it is authoritative, the
more the controversies are worked out.
This goes to an issue of what are called “black box” royalties.
MR. CHISICK: We’ll come to the black box royalties “after this,” as they say on
TV.
We are going to shift gears for a moment. Richard, coming from ASCAP, gives
us a good opportunity to highlight that the MMA may be substantially about mechanical
licensing, but it’s not only about mechanical licensing. I want to shift gears a little bit and
talk about the performing rights aspects of the MMA.
MR. REIMER: Thanks, Casey.
I think everybody knows that ASCAP and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) are two
performing rights organizations, two of the four in the United States today, but the only
6
two that are governed by consent decrees. The consent decrees have been in place for
seventy-plus years.
The MMA achieves some modification of the consent decree process. I want to
give a very brief recitation of the history that got us to the MMA.
From 2000–2010 ASCAP principally, but BMI as well, were involved in a large
number of Rate Court proceedings with digital music services and others in the digital
space. There was a great deal of dissatisfaction among our members and BMI affiliates
with the outcomes of those litigations, to the point where the major music publishers
asked the performing rights organizations to change their rules to permit so-called
“digital rights withdrawals” so that they could license directly in this space.
That led to ASCAP and BMI ultimately going to the Department of Justice in
2014, following decisions that effectively prevented those digital withdrawals. In 2014
we asked for modification of the decrees. That led to the so-called “fractional licensing
debate.”
Ultimately, in August 2016 the Department of Justice issued a closing letter
saying that they would not agree to modify the decrees and they thought that there should

6
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be 100 percent licensing; that is to say, ASCAP and BMI would have to license the entire
7
work even if they didn’t control all of the interests in the work.
That was really the run-up to the MMA. What we see in the MMA — and I think
Casey alluded to this earlier — are three provisions that deal with performing rights
licensing.
One deals with reform of the consent decrees themselves. The only way that
consent decrees can be modified is by agreement with the Department of Justice
approved by the courts that administer the consent decrees, currently Judge Cote for
ASCAP and Judge Stanton for BMI, both sitting in the Southern District of New York.
The MMA provides that if the government and the parties agree on changes,
before those changes can be implemented Congress must be involved. The Department of
Justice must notify the chairs and ranking members of the Judiciary Committees in the
House and the Senate, and presumably Congress would have an opportunity to have
hearings on any proposed revisions in the consent decrees.
The other two provisions in MMA deal with the Rate Court process itself.
There was a perception, I think on both sides, users and the PROs, that there was
the ability to game the system, in the sense that one could select which judge they
thought would be more suitable to the goals of a particular user or one of the societies in
a Rate Court proceeding. As a result, the MMA has a provision that requires any Rate
Court proceeding to be conducted by a judge chosen at random in the Southern District of
New York. It cannot be the consent decree judge for either ASCAP or BMI.
Finally, there is a provision that deals with the standards by which the rates can
be determined. The MMA permits the use of results in proceedings involving sound
recording performance rights but only for digital service providers.
As to where we wind up with the MMA, some of you may know that last year
Makan Delrahim became the Head of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division. He
announced that he was intent on reviewing all consent decrees, not obviously just the
ASCAP and BMI decrees. This has provided an incentive, I think, for not only ASCAP
and BMI but also the user community to advocate for further changes in the consent
decrees.
Congress has already jumped in. There have been meetings with staff of the
Judiciary Committee on the Senate side, and the users and the PROs have made
suggestions.
8
ASCAP and BMI issued a joint open letter on February 28 announcing that their
goals in terms of reform of the consent decrees include:
• First, sunset of the decrees. We recognize that this reform is going to take place
over a period of time. As a transition to the elimination of the decrees ultimately, we have
proposed that the automatic license granted by the consent decrees — anyone who writes
and applies for a license is entitled to a license immediately — would continue.
7
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• There ought to be a mechanism for immediate payment of interim license fees.
• The Rate Court process would continue over the period before the termination
of the decrees.
• ASCAP and BMI would continue to obtain only nonexclusive rights so that
members and users can enter into direct licenses.
• Any reform of the decrees would continue the current forms of license that are
currently available — the blanket license, the program license, and adjustable-fee
licenses.
That’s where we are at this point.
MR. CHISICK: There are two competing presumptions here. The MMA relies on
the presumption that regulation is necessary. Both on the mechanical side and the
performing rights side it is still necessary to regulate the royalties paid to songwriters.
I couldn’t help but notice, Richard, that you very casually referred to the
transition “to the termination of the decrees,” as though that’s a foregone conclusion, or at
least a foregone conclusion in the PROs’ minds.
The question is, is there or isn’t there a need for regulation of songwriter royalties
in 2019?
MR. STEINTHAL: The answer is absolutely yes. The reason why the provision
was put in the MMA that requires the Justice Department to report to Congress if the
Justice Department takes steps to sunset the decrees is because they had spent more than
a year developing a solution that would allow a smooth-functioning licensing
marketplace for digital music services in a fashion where the publishers and the
composers would get all the money upfront and build a database to distribute it.
Of course, digital streaming services are engaged in distributions of music that
implicate both the public performance right and the mechanical right. So Congress,
having fixed the problem on the mechanical right component, did so assuming that the
public performance rights licensing marketplace would remain largely efficient and
functioning.
The underlying problem is still there. If you take away the ASCAP and BMI
consent decrees and you take away the effective compulsory licensing thereunder, then
you are back where you were before, with no smoothly functioning mechanism for the
rights to be cleared.
MR. CHISICK: But what’s curious is that the United States is somewhat unique
in the fact that there is still a compulsory licensing system in the first place. That’s hardly
in vogue.
MR. STEINTHAL: We are also unique in we’re the only civilized country with
statutory damages of up to $150,000 per work infringed.
MR. CHISICK: Okay. Fair point.
MR. STEINTHAL: It’s the elephant in the closet. In every other country, if you
infringe, especially if you are doing your best to get licenses and you don’t get some
because it’s hard to do it, your damages are going to be essentially what the licensing fee
would have been and perhaps the costs of the suit.
MR. CHISICK: No, no, no, no, no.
MR. STEINTHAL: Canada has some degree of a statutory license. Other than the
United States and Canada, nowhere else. That’s the bludgeoning that the publishers and
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the record companies have used over the years, the club of potential damages of $150,000
per work. I bet you a lot of the services would trade off no compulsory licensing for no
statutory damages in a heartbeat.
MR. CHISICK: Frank, I saw you moving around back there.
MR. SCIBILIA: Do you ever wonder why songwriters are the most regulated
profession in the United States? Why do we need to regulate the income of songwriters?
MR. STEINTHAL: We need to find them. We need to have a mechanism for the
information to be available.
MR. SCIBILIA: We are now talking about paying them. In terms of paying them,
we are talking about statutory provisions enacted back in the days when there was the
Aeolian manufacturer of piano rolls and the government was concerned that it was going
to corner the market on music by getting exclusive licenses to use the music in piano
rolls.
MR. CHISICK: I was concerned no one was going to mention piano rolls in this
panel.
MR. SCIBILIA: It’s a hundred years later, and the beneficiaries of the
compulsory license and the consent decrees are Google and Apple and Amazon. They
don’t need protection in negotiating with songwriters.
In terms of antitrust issues, as I think Mr. Delrahim has said, if there are antitrust
concerns, if somebody is acting as an antitrust violator — as Ken knows because he’ll go
out and sue them as he sued the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers
(SESAC) — you could bring a private right of action and you can get the Department of
Justice to get involved.
But why do we need to have the rates regulated? Today, in the year 2019, I think
that is an anomaly.
MR. CHISICK: Sean?
PROF. O’CONNOR: We have small independent photographers; why is that not
the same situation? We have lots of areas in copyright where the creators are smaller,
independent “indie” players, and we don’t have them regulated under consent decrees.
MR. STEINTHAL: Bars and nightclubs absolutely benefit from the ASCAP and
BMI compulsory licenses.
PROF. O’CONNOR: But they could still get blanket licenses.
MR. STEINTHAL: Wait a minute, wait a minute. There’s no way in the world
that general licensees could effectively get licenses for all the music that plays in their
establishments absent an effective compulsory license. There’s just no way.
PROF. O’CONNOR: What about SESAC and the others who are not part of the
consent decree?
MR. STEINTHAL: Well, SESAC was sued under the antitrust laws and agreed to
thirty years of arbitration and an effective compulsory license under that settlement
agreement.
MR. REIMER: Not for bars and restaurants.
MR. STEINTHAL: No, not for bars and restaurants.
PROF. O’CONNOR: I have actually represented bars and restaurants who were
being approached by SESAC. Now there are other PROs out there. When I talk to the
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local bar owners in Seattle, they ask me, “What the heck do we do? Now we’ve got a
bunch of them.”
MR. STEINTHAL: They need it.
PROF. O’CONNOR: But they are not doing it in the same way. BMI and ASCAP
are under the consent decrees but the other PROs are not. We’ve got to open up the
market.
MR. REIMER: Your clients are going to get licenses, right? They are not going
to risk being sued by anybody. Then it just becomes a matter of negotiating the rates. You
can negotiate in other industries. Why can’t you negotiate in this one?
MR. STEINTHAL: I think, especially when you get to the general licensees, they
are absolutely without a mechanism to fairly assess whose music they are using and how
much to pay for it. Whatever the PRO says they want to get, what are they going to do?
They just have to pay whatever it is the PRO says they should pay.
MR. REIMER: There is something called the NRA — not the National Rifle
Association but the National Restaurant Association — and they refuse to come to the
table to negotiate.
MR. SCIBILIA: I would also draw a distinction between general licenses and
digital streaming services, as we tried to do when the publishers wanted to withdraw
digital rights from ASCAP and BMI. Even if the consent decrees are sunset, the PROs do
serve a very valuable purpose, including the general licensing of bars and clubs, because
they are dispersed throughout the country and it’s hard to license them all.
But Google and Apple already enter into direct licenses. They need all sorts of
rights, so they enter into direct licenses with those same companies that they can get all
the rights from, including mechanical rights and including performance rights, and they
can negotiate those in the free market. I don’t see why we have to separate out certain
rights that are negotiated freely and other rights that are not negotiated freely.
MR. STEINTHAL: I will go back to the easy example of the new releases, which
is the lifeblood of the services that are distributing music, like Spotify, like Amazon, like
Google Play. You cannot get licenses for information that is not available in the market.
Therefore, they would be at risk for every new release that they played if they didn’t have
a license for it. And how do you get a license for something that doesn’t yet exist — i.e.,
a copyright owner who steps forward and says, “I own the rights to this composition?”
MR. SCIBILIA: Where does the recording come from? Does somebody give it to
you? Does somebody say, “Hey, here’s my sound recording; put it on Spotify”? Shouldn’t
I ask, “Who are you? Do I have the right to license that from you?” That's the way it has
traditionally been done.
MR. STEINTHAL: I wish the sound recording companies would convey the
rights. In a normal marketplace — and this is the way mechanical rights were cleared
before — in the old physical day, the sound recording companies cleared all the rights,
and they repped and warranted to Sam Goody or whoever was the distributor, “Don’t
worry about it; I’ve cleared all the rights.” They wouldn’t do that for digital distribution.
That’s why my clients are stuck having to clear the publishing rights and have no idea
who owns the publishing rights, especially for the new releases.
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MR. CHISICK: Before we shift gears in a few minutes to the black box, is there
anybody in the audience who wants to get in on this fun? Now is the time. Put up your
hands and we’ll call on you.
QUESTION [Lauri Rechardt, IFPI, London]: A question for Ken. You said that it
is impossible for the services to get licenses. But the services get the licenses outside the
United States. As someone said, the United States is the outlier. So can you elaborate
about the impossibility?
MR. STEINTHAL: If you are talking about the label licenses, yes, we get label
licenses.
QUESTIONER [Mr. Rechardt]: No, publishing. Of course with respect to labels,
as you know, everything works on the basis of direct licensing.
MR. STEINTHAL: On the publishing side, yes, the major services will go and
seek direct licenses from the largest music publishers, but they absolutely rely on the
effective compulsory licensing under Section 115 for mechanicals, under the
ASCAP/BMI consent decrees and licenses. They rely on those for the long tail. The “long
tail” is the term for the 90 percent of the music out there that constitutes 10 percent of the
plays.
PROF. HUGHES: Ken may be being asked — and he may not want to answer —
why in other countries without statutory damages Spotify will do a deal with the big
music publishers but doesn’t worry about it if deals aren’t done everywhere.
MR. STEINTHAL: I can’t answer that. I just don’t know.
QUESTIONER [Mr. Rechardt]: The point, Ken, is that outside the United States
these compulsory licenses do not exist and yet all the music is available and the deals are
being done.
PROF. HUGHES: But all the music is available because there aren’t statutory
damages. If you don’t have statutory damages, it’s a lot easier to put up stuff that maybe
you’re not 100 percent sure you've got the rights to.
QUESTIONER [Mr. Rechardt]: It’s all seems a little bit speculative to me.
MR. STEINTHAL: The statutory damages issue is a pervasive issue, and it’s the
answer to a lot of the questions as to why we need compulsory licensing.
MR. CHISICK: I want to shift gears and talk about the black box, but before I do
Richard just wants to let you know that there are copies — well, go ahead.
MR. REIMER: There are copies of the ASCAP/BMI open letter, in case anyone’s
interested in reading it.
MR. CHISICK: Justin, you mentioned the black box issue, so why don’t you
introduce the issue again and let’s talk about that?
PROF. HUGHES: The black box issue is simply about the royalties that are
sitting there where you might have a name but you can’t identify sufficiently who to pay.
The question is: what do you do with them, and when do you do what you do with them,
and how long do you let them sit? For example, Spotify in one of its class actions — I
9
think it was a class action over $200 million — agreed to a settlement of $43 million, but
9

See Ferrick v. Spotify USA Inc., No. 16-CV-8412 (AJN), 2018 WL 2324076, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2018), appeal dismissed sub nom. Ferrick v. Diable, No. 18-1702, 2018 WL
6431410 (2d Cir. Oct. 9, 2018).
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

714/960-4577

17
Session 9B
the truth of that settlement is the $43 million sits with Spotify until people come and
collect it.
So the black box issue is one that divides, as I understand it, the contenders to be
the MLC. There are accusations that the contender that is backed by SoundExchange and
the National Music Publishers Association (NMPA) would adopt a mechanism which,
while following the statute, might quickly lead to the uncommitted and unidentified and
uncollected proceeds and royalties going to the big majors, going to the major publishers.
The American Mechanical Licensing Collective (AMLC) proposal would have greater
efforts to figure out who gets the proceeds of the black box.
But remember, too, that the size of the black box, the size of the undistributed
royalties, depends on how good your database is. If your database is better and better and
better, the size of the undistributed royalties shrinks; and if your database isn’t so hot, the
size of the undistributed royalties grows. So the problem has different dimensions.
MR. SCIBILIA: Yes, sure.
First of all, I’d like to correct the notion that SoundExchange is somehow
involved with the MLC. It’s not. The MLC, as I said, was founded by copyright owners.
The Nashville Songwriters Association International (NSAI), Songwriters of North
America (SONA), and NMPA have assisted in that process. SoundExchange is a potential
vendor, as are several other potential vendors, including HFA and Music Reports. There’s
a request-for-proposal process going on for that.
In terms of the so-called “black box,” I think there has again been a lot of
misinformation that has been spread.
First of all, as you said, the statute already has certain governance requirements.
The statute requires the board of the MLC to contain both publisher members and
songwriter members. Every publisher member that is on the board of any entity that is
seeking designation as the collective is going to arguably have an interest in the black box
royalties to the extent that any ultimately exist.
Second, in terms of this particular MLC that my firm has represented, there was a
process where a songwriter panel vetted and selected songwriters for MLC board seats.
Songwriters were voted on; songwriters were selected by songwriters. Publishers were
selected by publishers. Most of the publishers on the board are actually independent
publishers; in fact, the Unclaimed Royalties Oversight Committee that will be involved in
these unclaimed royalty issues is made up exclusively of small independent publishers.
So things are being done to ensure that everything is transparent and everything is done
aboveboard.
That said, also as I said before, I think the incentives are there for the collective,
whoever is chosen, to really work hard to match as many songs as possible, to find as
many copyright owners as possible. That’s the goal; the MLC wants to have everybody
who is supposed to get paid be paid, and be paid correctly.
As MLC said in its submission to the Copyright Office, in its view the statute
does not even permit the collective to make a distribution of unclaimed royalties until
2023, and the MLC doesn’t even necessarily intend to do so then. It will try to match as
many works as possible, find as many copyright owners as possible, before making a
distribution. That’s its goal.
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Of course, the ability to do that will depend to some extent on the funding, so
we’ve got to make sure the MLC is funded so that it can do the important tasks that it is
designated to do under the statute.
MR. CHISICK: What is the matching process supposed to look like? Is it all an
internal process? Is there some interface with the public outside the confines of the
collective? How is that supposed to work under the MLC process?
MR. SCIBILIA: There is supposed to be a public database.
PROF. HUGHES: The statute is very elaborate in all the ways the database is
supposed to be public. Presumably, it will be publicly searchable by individual
songwriters. Because it is searchable by individual songwriters, whoever the MLC is, all
kinds of songwriter organizations should do massive outreach to say, “Once it’s up and
running, get on there and find out if your stuff is there; and, if your stuff isn’t there,
pursue the mechanism to get it corrected.”
PROF. O’CONNOR: But just remember you still would have to find all the
sound recordings. So, you can put yourself in the database as a composer, but then it
sounds like the onus is still on you to figure out all the sound recordings. That can be
tough with people around the world making random recordings all the time.
MR. SCIBILIA: Actually, the intention is to have, in addition to a database that
people can populate with their rights ownership for the works they own, a claiming
portal. There will be a claiming portal for the sound recordings where the musical works
rights owners are unknown and for which the royalties are unallocated and not yet paid
because nobody has claimed them. Those will be sound recording-specific. If you are
somebody who thinks you might have a claim to royalties, you could go to that portal and
make a claim.
PROF. O’CONNOR: I don’t disagree with that.
MR. CHISICK: And the database is supposed to have a matching mechanism
from the sound recording to the composition owners; is that right?
PROF. O’CONNOR: Yes. I like that idea, but it’s a “wait and see” to see if it
actually works.
PROF. HUGHES: When I said SoundExchange, I was actually being
complimentary because I think they’ve done a better job than most of the database
developers I have seen. Since the trick is not just to have an authoritative database of
musical compositions but to actually connect it to an authoritative database of sound
recordings, I think that if they weren’t in the puzzle, I would wonder why.
MR. SCIBILIA: The reason I balked is because certain publications, to be
unnamed, appear to have made the assumption that this is a predetermined process, that
SoundExchange has been preselected, when it in fact has not.
MR. CHISICK: I think the way the black box money is dealt with is the source of
a lot of the controversy. One of the criticisms that I have read said that distributing black
box money according to market share to music publishers is precisely the inverse
situation to what it ought to be, because then the royalties that are least likely to be
claimed are the royalties that are attributable to long-tail compositions that will not
necessarily belong to music publishers.
PROF. HUGHES: The Sean O’Connor works, for example.
MR. CHISICK: To Sean O’Connor.
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PROF. HUGHES: I think he’s doing well.
MR. CHISICK: Is that a fair criticism; and, if so, how can it be dealt with
differently?
PROF. O’CONNOR: In a way, isn’t that what happens with radio now?
MR. CHISICK: Yes.
PROF. HUGHES: Yes. That’s a good idea then.
PROF. O’CONNOR: No, no, no. I’m trying to be fair. Look, I’m trying to be
objective here. I agree, but I’m saying that is the same criticism we had with radio for a
long time, too.
MR. SCIBILIA: First of all, the statute is set up that way. But what’s the
alternative, to let Spotify keep it?
MR. CHISICK: I don’t know.
PROF. HUGHES: Actually, I can give you an alternative. One alternative would
be, instead of it getting distributed to the music publishers, the money should be sent to
music education programs in magnet schools around the country.
I don’t say that flippantly. There was a very early moment in 1998, when the
copyright extension was being discussed — it was not very public, and it won’t be; none
of you will tell, right? — when the White House seriously considered that some of the
proceeds would have to go to the National Endowment for the Arts.
PROF. O’CONNOR: I think that’s a good idea.
But I want to go back to my thing about “fair trade certified” again. Let me give
another perspective as somebody who does still record — not well. If you are working in
Pro Tools — and any musician in the room will know this — when you are doing the
final bounce-down (after you have recorded a bunch of tracks, you mix it down, you
bounce it down) you put metadata in that file you generate. Everyone who is recording in
a digital native medium is putting in metadata. The question is, what happens to that
stuff; where does it go?
Again, I think that we really should be focusing on, whether it’s mandated
through statute or somehow regulatory or a private ordering, is to come together and
figure this out and negotiate it. A lot of the major digital music service providers should
think about adopting this. It’s kind of a win-win all around.
PROF. HUGHES: But, Sean, let me ask you a question. First of all, does the
designation of the metadata really guide you on the type of metadata? Second, you just
moved across the country, didn’t you?
PROF. O’CONNOR: I did.
PROF. HUGHES: So is the metadata accurate on all those?
PROF. O’CONNOR: Location you don’t really worry about. I don’t worry about
that. Location is not one of the normal categories. The normal categories are genre, artist,
composer.
PROF. HUGHES: Right. But the problem is we might know the names of a lot of
artists but we simply just don’t know how to find them. We know the names of a lot of
songwriters but we can’t find them.
PROF. O’CONNOR: But if the database is successful, someone like me, a very
small-time songwriter, could go and put my name in there. What I’m saying then is if
there are any recordings out there that list me as the songwriter, now I can match it up.
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I’m not disagreeing that the songwriters have some work to do, but I’m saying
that we all have to meet each other halfway on this and make it possible.
MR. SCIBILIA: To some degree, the recordings that are in the unallocated or
unmatched royalty database may not be completely divorced in terms of copyright
ownership from the people or the entities who are going to be sharing in the unallocated
royalties. Like Kenny said, sometimes things get thrown up there on the Internet —
maybe it’s a cover of a Billy Joel song — that doesn’t mean that Universal doesn’t own
that recording, but it just hasn’t been cleared to the point that it has been designated as a
Billy Joel song.
PROF. O’CONNOR: Yes.
MR. CHISICK: The concern that Kenny was expressing earlier — and it’s a
concern you hear a lot — is that these songs are released at a time when the ownership
splits haven’t been determined. It’s easy if you are writing and recording your own music
and there’s one songwriter. It’s not so easy if you have ten or fourteen co-writers on an
urban music composition, for example, which is common.
MR. STEINTHAL: It’s often not even agreed. In other words, the writers have
disputes among themselves over who is going to get what split, and it takes a while to
sort itself out.
PROF. O’CONNOR: I agree.
One question I have is, who is the onus on to update the database when there is
either outright litigation, and then we realize we have to add somebody else, or it gets
settled before finalized and we add another songwriter?
MR. STEINTHAL: The beauty of the statute is that it creates the flow of money
into the collective while those disputes are being resolved.
PROF. HUGHES: Yes, and that is different from the old system statutorily.
MR. STEINTHAL: Correct.
PROF. HUGHES: I have a question for Richard. I know from talking to you guys
that you will frequently have the band come and say, “We’re going to list all of us as on
the composition, and Bob gets 20 percent and Jessica gets 40 percent.” How long does it
take between the release of a record with new musical compositions and when you
actually have that at the PRO?
MR. REIMER: It could take weeks; it could take months. But in the PRO world
we are distributing current moneys based on performances that occurred six months prior.
PROF. HUGHES: Right, right, right.
MR. REIMER: So we have the time to sort it all out.
PROF. HUGHES: You have the time lag.
MR. REIMER: Yes.
MR. CHISICK: I come from a jurisdiction where a lot of what is in the MMA
has been tried as part of a private settlement of a different problem, which was the
pending and unmatched royalties in the physical world, with a public claims process,
with the reproduction right collectives — Canadian Musical Reproduction Rights Agency
(CMRRA) and Society for Reproduction Rights of Authors, Composers, and Publishers
in Canada (SODRAC) — jointly administering a claims process and finally a market
share distribution.
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It’s interesting that you hear all of these accusations that the publishers are
somehow self-interested — and you can understand why the criticism is there — but in
practice an enormous amount of the money that had not been distributed was distributed
to the rightholders because there was suddenly an incentive to do that. The collecting
societies, which are controlled by songwriters and publishers, have managed to do a
pretty good job of doing that before the market share distribution occurred. So part of me
wonders why there is the concern that this model cannot be replicated in the United
States.
MR. STEINTHAL: I think the goal is to replicate that model.
MR. CHISICK: I understand. But we’re hearing all of this ruckus about the
publishers conspiring to keep the money out of the hands of the people who deserve it.
That is inconsistent with what I’ve seen.
MR. STEINTHAL: From the services’ perspective it’s the publishers' and the
songwriters’ problem. We want to put the money in and let them figure out how to
distribute it.
One of the other things we haven’t talked about that is a huge problem is, what is
the cost of this collective going to be? How is the money going to be raised to fund this
very, very expensive undertaking? The MLC and AMLC had fundamentally different
cost propositions advanced as to what this database was going to cost. The services are
not going write a blank check, although they are going to have to write a big check. That
is a big issue that is going to be litigated probably over the course of the next year.
MR. CHISICK: Does anybody want to address the question of cost?
PROF. HUGHES: I think it should be low. That’s one reason why I spoke highly
of SoundExchange. If you start with that, you have half the data already pretty
authoritatively, and I think the cost should be fairly low.
MR. STEINTHAL: There are vendors out there — Harry Fox and MRI have
been mentioned in this panel — the Society of Composers, Authors, and Music
Publishers of Canada (SOCAN); and I think SESAC is now affiliated with Harry Fox —
and there have been investments made by these companies that manage the lion’s share of
this data. The question is how to aggregate it all into one place and then sort through the
data, to have a common way of processing it. It shouldn’t be as expensive as one of the
collectives said it would likely be.
PROF. HUGHES: Right. My last thing is that some of the cost might actually just
be the cost of political compromise, not the cost of a real market. I am very concerned
that the database we should go for is the most authoritative and the best, not the political
compromise database.
MR. STEINTHAL: Hear, hear!
MR. SCIBILIA: Yes.
We talked today a lot about a lot of the things that the collective has to do,
especially if they want to do it well, including finding the songwriters and matching the
data to make sure the right people are getting paid.
The collective is a brand-new entity with a host of statutory responsibilities,
which are set out in the Act at Section 115(d)(3)(C)(i). The collective’s responsibilities
include:
• Offering and administering blanket licenses;
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• Collecting and distributing royalties;
• Matching and identifying musical works in sound recordings (including manual
efforts) and locating copyright owners;
• Maintaining and updating the rights database, including the transfer of rights;
• Administering the ownership claiming process and managing the claiming
portal;
• Administering the collections of the administrative assessment and participating
in assessment proceedings;
• Engaging in and responding to audits and filing bankruptcy claims;
• Reporting to stakeholders, including in annual and other reports;
• Managing disputes, including split disputes, for millions of works; and
• Monitoring and enforcing compliance with the terms of the license and the
statute and its implementing regulations, including accurate calculation of royalty pools
and rates and defaults in licensee reporting.
You cannot compare the collective’s costs to what one service might pay to one
vendor today because the collective will be engaging in nationwide activities on behalf of
all blanket licenses and significant non-blanket licenses, and not just for streaming but
also downloading. The scale is exponentially larger.
If you look at what the Congressional Budget Office budgeted for this — and
they had experts look at this — they said it was going to cost roughly $30 million per
10
year.
I think it’s natural for the services to want to pay less because they are going to
be funding it. But, at the same time, they have to make sure that the collective is not
underfunded, because if it’s underfunded, it can’t perform its duties; where, on the other
hand, if it’s overfunded, it’s not really a problem because the collective can just apply any
excess to the next period.
Also, given that one of the collective’s duties is enforcement with respect to
accounting and payment by the services, one has to ask whether the services might
benefit from underfunding because if the collective is underfunded, it would be less able
to engage in these statutorily required enforcement efforts.
I also think any discussion of the costs of the collective to the services should
also be tied to a discussion of the benefits of the collective to the services, in particular,
the ability to obtain a blanket license and the limitation on liability from hundreds of
millions of dollars in statutory damages provided they follow statutory procedure.
The MMA struck a bargain. The services wanted the limitation on liability and
they wanted the ease and the protection of the blanket license. To obtain those benefits
they agreed to fund the collective. Now they seem to want the benefits but without the
burden.
MR. CHISICK: So you see, as I said at the beginning, consensus, everybody’s
happy, it’s working out great, and we are all looking forward to seeing how it pans out.
[Laughter]
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See, e.g., Cong. Budget Office, S. 2823 Music Modernization Act Cost Estimate 3
(2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2018-09/s2823.pdf.
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Thank you to the panelists for a fantastic discussion. Thank you to Fordham for
hosting us.
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